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Judging Women: 






This paper engages with the work of Catharine MacKinnon to consider 
three ways of understanding the phrase "judging women." First, when is it 
acceptable or necessary to make judgements about what women do? The paper 
argues that feminist analysis urges compassion and empathy for women, but 
also highlights the ways that choices are limited and shaped by patriarchy. Thus 
we cannot and should not avoid all judgment of women’s—and men’s—choices. 
Second, when can women engage in the act of judging? It is sometimes claimed 
that it is anti-feminist to engage in such judgment, and that feminists must above 
all else avoid being judgmental. The paper rejects this idea and argues instead 
that feminism should insist on women's right to exercise judgment: women’s 
voices matter. Third, how are we to judge who counts as a woman? MacKinnon’s 
work offers profound, sustained, rich analysis of these questions, but does not 
fully resolve them. 
 
 





One cannot really overstate the importance of Catharine MacKinnon’s 
work. Its philosophical, political, and legal impact is huge. MacKinnon’s legal 
work has improved the standing of women around the world, and her political 
philosophy is both a defining statement of feminism and a challenge that every 
theorist, feminist or not, must face. 
Re-reading Toward a Feminist Theory of the State for the purposes of this 
special edition, I kept wanting to interrupt my reading. Every page, every 
paragraph, has a claim that I want to tell people about and discuss with them. So 




so obviously right, 
so fraught with difficulty, 
at the same time the final word on one question,  
and the thrown-down gauntlet on another. 
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Reading MacKinnon, in other words, is an exhilarating ride through 
philosophy and politics, a journey in which it is impossible to sit still and in which 
it is no use wearing a seat belt. There is going to be challenge, there is going to 
be danger, and there is, above all, going to be an emergency stop: a point at 
which everything sharply judders to a halt, silence descends, and you whisper to 
yourself, Can that really be true? and, at the very same moment, How could I not 
have seen this before?  
It is tempting, then, simply to proceed by quoting a selection of my 
favourite MacKinnon sentences. But I will resist that temptation and try to make 
a more sustained contribution. 
One philosophical question with which I have been grappling for some 
time, and which Toward a Feminist Theory of the State tackles head-on, is how 
much significance we should grant to the fact of choice. The role of choice is 
problematic within the context of social construction generally and gender 
inequality specifically. In liberal theory, choice is treated as what I call a 
‘normative transformer,’ something that transforms a prima facie unjust 
inequality into a just one. I have argued that the fact of social construction 
prevents choice from playing this role (Chambers 2008). We cannot assess the 
justice of a situation by reference to a choice that is itself, at the most profound 
and sometimes unconscious level, a result of that situation. This over-reliance on 
individual choice is a central problem for liberalism. 
MacKinnon’s work provides foundations for this critique. She writes that 
liberalism’s “aggregation of freely-acting persons is replaced, in radical feminism, 
with a complex political determinism. Women and women’s actions are complex 
responses to conditions they did not make or control; they are contextualized 
and situated. Yet their responses contextualize and situate the actions of others” 
(1989, 46–47). And, as she puts it in the chapter on consciousness-raising: 
 
The instrument of social perception is created by the social process by 
which women are controlled. But this apparent paradox is not a solipsistic 
circle or a subjectivist retreat. Realizing that women largely recognize 
themselves in sex-stereotyped terms, really do feel the needs they have 
been encouraged to feel, do feel fulfilled in the expected ways, often 
actually choose what has been prescribed, makes possible the realization 
that women at the same time do not recognize themselves in, do not 
feel, and have not chosen this place. (1989, 102) 
 
MacKinnon here draws our attention to our situation as simultaneously 
recipients and transmitters of norms, victims and agents of oppression, 
conformists and rebels, apologists and malcontents. We are all trying to find 
ways to negotiate the social demands on us: how to fit in while remaining 
individual, how to distinguish those preferences that are authentic from those 
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that are distorted, how to live in a way that both we and others can accept, how 
to find a place that is both unique and human. Western liberal culture requires 
both conformity and individuality. The individual is exalted as a unit of analysis 
even while being expected to fit into recognisable social tropes. Culture urges us 
to assimilate and to differentiate, with predictably unpredictable effects. 
An issue that arises from this analysis is the question of judgment. One 
feature of contemporary popular feminism is the rejection of judgment: the idea 
that it is somehow a violation of feminist ideals, and perhaps a general moral 
failing, to assess other women’s behaviour and find it wanting. One encounters 
this conviction in discussions of parenting (which usually means mothering—the 
critique of judgment is most pointed in matters of breast- versus bottle-feeding), 
activism, domestic violence, Fifty Shades of Grey-inspired sadomasochism, 
beauty practices, and cultural difference.1  
Consider some examples from the popular media. Jemma Wayne writes 
in the Huffington Post that the phenomenon of women who judge other 
women’s parenting styles on online forums is “just as dangerous [a] trend 
undermining feminist values” as the sexualisation of children.2 The risk, 
according to Wayne, is great: “with every wagging finger we are unravelling the 
victories of feminism.” Jessica Wakeman, in The Frisky, writes that, for feminists, 
“there are a lot of areas where I think being judgmental is inappropriate, 
particularly when it comes to people’s private choices that do not hurt anyone 
else and do not affect you.”3 Kiara Imani Williams, in the Huffington Post again, 
writes, “You Know What is Worse Than Donald Trump? Other Judgmental 
Women.”4 
Michaele Ferguson interprets critiques of judgment like these as part of 
choice feminism: the idea that feminism means respecting women’s choices, 
whatever they may be, on the assumption that choice is the measure of 
freedom. Ferguson proposes that choice feminism is, inter alia, an attempt to 
                                                        
1 Linda Zerilli discusses the question of whether feminist may judge those from 
other cultures in “Toward a Feminist Theory of Judgment” (2009), a title that 
invokes MacKinnon even though MacKinnon is not mentioned at all. 
2 Jemma Wayne, “Mother Judgement: How Women Are Undermining Modern 
Feminism,” Huffington Post, 4 April 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/jemma-wayne/women-undermining-modern-
feminism_b_3006752.html. 
3 Jessica Wakeman, “The Soapbox: On Feminism & Judging Other Women,” The 
Frisky, 19 June 2012, http://www.thefrisky.com/2012-06-19/the-soapbox-on-
feminism-judging-other-women/. 
4 Kiara Imani Williams, “You Know What’s Worse for Women Than Donald 
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neutralise three criticisms of (non-choice) feminism: it is too radical, it is 
exclusionary, and it is judgmental. Her analysis is that “feminism will continue to 
provoke these three criticisms so long as it is deeply critical of existing 
institutions, or aims in any way to speak for or about a collectivity (such as 
women), or claims that the personal is political” (2010, 249). Ferguson suggests 
that, while it is both understandable and in some sense laudable for feminism to 
wish to “make feminism appeal to as many people as possible” (250), feminists 
should not shy away from judgment. “Without making judgments,” she writes, 
“politics becomes vacuous relativism: we have no reason to prefer one course of 
action over another. . . . Political freedom requires that we make the best 
judgments that we can, without knowing for certain that the judgments we make 
are correct” (251). 
Ferguson’s analysis is helpful and perceptive. I agree with Ferguson that 
the concern to avoid judgment is a key feature of choice feminism; I agree with 
her (as I argued in Chambers 2008) that the focus on choice as the measure of 
freedom is ultimately not compatible with feminism as a political and 
philosophical project; and I agree with her that one must “resist the temptation 
to reject judgment” (Ferguson 2010, 252). Ferguson suggests that the concern to 
avoid judgement is a concern to make people like feminism and feminists. This 
may well be part of the matter. In addition, as evident in the examples from 
popular feminism given earlier, judgement is often rejected not just for being 
unappealing but for being in some way normatively wrong. In the first part of this 
paper, I want to question this normative critique of judgement. Why is avoiding 
judgment seen by some as a central feminist concern? 
Feminists might well worry about judgment that is directed to women, 
since one aspect of feminism is the need to listen to women rather than 
denigrate or silence them. But in wider patriarchal society, judgment is 
demonised when it is done by women. Women are not supposed to judge, not 
supposed to think themselves sufficiently qualified to have opinions or criticise 
others, particularly if those others are men. This is part of the reason why 
women in the public eye are subject to such vile online abuse,5 particularly if 
they write about issues on which men feel themselves to be particular experts 
(which is to say: all issues). A woman is not supposed to have a controversial 
opinion (which is to say: any opinion). I don't think I’ve ever heard a man berate 
                                                        
5 See Becky Gardiner, Mahana Mansfield, Ian Anderson, Josh Hodler, Daan Louter 
and Monica Ulmanu, “The dark side of Guardian comments,” Guardian, 12 April 
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/12/the-dark-side-of-
guardian-comments; and David Grimer, “Men Read Mean Tweets About Female 








himself or another man for being too judgmental. As MacKinnon might say, 
judgment is a male method. 
I get the sense, from discussions with my students and others, that 
readers of MacKinnon often feel that they are being judged. I certainly feel that 
way. That feeling is, for me, part of the exhilaration that I referred to earlier: 
there is exoneration in MacKinnon’s work, and explanation, and excitement, but 
there is also judgment. I think one of the reasons I have to keep stopping when I 
read her work is that I keep needing to introspect: Do I do that? And: Should I 
stop?  
MacKinnon address this point directly: 
 
Feminism aspires to represent the experience of all women as women 
see it, yet criticizes antifeminism and misogyny, including by women. Not 
all women agree with the feminist account of women’s situation, nor do 
all feminists agree with any single rendition of feminism. Authority of 
interpretation—here, the claim to speak for all women—is always fraught 
because authority is the issue male method is intended to settle. 
Consider the accounts of their own experience given by right-wing 
women and lesbian sadomasochists. How can male supremacy be 
diminishing to women when women embrace and defend their place in 
it? How can dominance and submission violate women when women 
eroticize it? Now what is women’s point of view? (1989, 115) 
 
For MacKinnon, the answer is neither subjectivism nor determinism. We must 
not assume that women are free, having what MacKinnon calls “considerable 
latitude to make or choose the meanings of their situation” (1989, 116). No 
individual is the final arbiter of the meaning of her action. But we must also not 
rely on an idea of false consciousness, according to which “they” are hopelessly 
blinded by their situatedness while “we” somehow remain magically isolated, 
perspectivally pure. Instead, the project of feminism “is to uncover and claim as 
valid the experience of women, the major content of which is the devalidation of 
women’s experience” (116). 
Judgment is thus particularly fraught. There is a serious qualm about 
claiming to speak for all women, to assert the authority of the authentic female 
voice. This qualm is both to be respected (after all, who are we to judge?) and 
rejected (why shouldn’t we judge?!).  
Now, one sense in which it may be right to refrain from judgment is that 
it is not helpful to judge people for doing something that they cannot avoid 
doing, or for responding rationally to circumstances they cannot control. And so 
it does not make sense to judge women for participating in beauty practices in a 
world that judges them always and everywhere on their appearance; or to judge 
women for staying with abusive partners in a world that fails to protect them 
from violence whether they stay or whether they leave; or to judge women for 
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enjoying sadomasochism in a world that teaches them from childhood that they 
will find romantic and sexual fulfilment in submission; or to judge women for 
participating in pornography and prostitution in a world that suggests that doing 
so is empowering, lucrative and freely chosen, even at the same time as women 
and children by the thousands are forced into prostitution and pornography by 
poverty, violence, and powerlessness. Of course, we can praise the bravery and 
feminism of those who reject beauty practices, or who leave violent men, or who 
resist pornography, or who escape prostitution. But these things are difficult, 
often crushingly so, and feminism cannot write off women who do not achieve 
them. 
Still, it surely must make sense to judge men who participate in and 
benefit from these practices. It is hard to envisage a feminism that lets abusive 
men off the hook. Although both women and men would be better off in a world 
without patriarchy, freed from the oppression of gender inequality, it is 
unpalatable to extend sympathy or even empathy to those men who actively 
brutalise, use, and exploit women and children. Perhaps the fact that abusive 
men benefit, in terms of power, wealth, and sexual gratification, makes them 
proper subjects of judgment. But then can we judge those women who deftly 
manipulate the position patriarchy gives them, those who find status and 
success, of sorts, through maintaining practices of gender inequality? 
MacKinnon studiously avoids making what she terms a moral critique: 
 
This book is not a moral tract. It is not about right and wrong or what I 
think is good or bad to do. It is about what is, the meaning of what is, and 
the way what is, is enforced. (1989, xii) 
 
Earlier I mentioned that Toward a Feminist Theory of the State is full of 
compelling arguments. In the interests of balance, let me state that the claim just 
quoted may be my least favourite part of the book. I dislike it for two reasons. 
First, I find it unconvincing. The idea that there can be a non-moral statement of 
what is seems to me to contradict MacKinnon’s claims that “there is no 
Archimedean point” (1989, 117), no “purely ontological category,” no “category 
of “being” free of social perception” (119). The recognition that there is no 
authentic subject-position outside of social construction means that we must 
rely on normative critique if we are to have critique at all. We cannot be against 
rape and pornography because women are not objects for the sexual pleasure of 
men because, under patriarchy, they are. We cannot be against sexual 
harassment and female poverty because women are not unequal to men 
because, under patriarchy, they are. We are against rape and pornography and 
sexual harassment and gendered poverty because women should not be unequal 
to men, should not be objects for the sexual pleasure of men, and because it is 
bad to treat them in that way. And if it is bad to treat women in this way then it 
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is bad for men to do it, and it is bad for women to do it, and it is at least 
sometimes right to judge those who do it. 
The second reason why I dislike MacKinnon’s refusal to declare “what I 
think is good or bad to do” is that I find it unsatisfying. I would like to know what 
she thinks is good or bad to do, not just in the legal struggles in which she is such 
a crucial participant, but in general. In our personal lives, in that space where the 
political is truly to be found, where what is is most significant and most 
entrenched, what should we do? 
Now one answer that MacKinnon gives to this question is consciousness-
raising, which she terms feminism’s method. MacKinnon argues that 
consciousness-raising, namely systematic collective attention paid to the realities 
of women’s everyday and personal lives, is politically significant because it is in 
our personal and everyday lives that male dominance is most located. As she 
puts it: 
 
Daily social actions are seen to cooperate with and conform to a 
principle. They are not random, natural, socially neutral, or without 
meaning beyond themselves. They are not freely willed, but they are 
actions nonetheless. From seeing that such actions have meaning for 
maintaining and constantly reaffirming the structure of male supremacy 
at their expense, women can come to see the possibility, even the 
necessity, of acting differently. (1989, 101) 
 
This account of consciousness-raising offers hope. It tells us that there can be 
feminist activism in every action and every location: when thinking, when 
reading, when caring, when working, when living. We can do these things in an 
unconscious, habitual way, in a way that conforms to our social context with its 
explicit and implicit patriarchy. Or we can attempt to do these things in a more 
conscious way, in a way that is at least aware of, and ideally does something to 




In the current political climate, one area of women’s experience that has 
become profoundly invalidated relates to the question of who counts as a 
woman and thus what counts as women’s experience. The question “What is a 
woman?” is a question that MacKinnon identifies as “implicit in feminism” (1989, 
54). Her answer is developed in chapter 3 of Toward a Feminist Theory of the 
State. In this discussion, the distinction between moral judgment and political 
critique comes once again to the foreground. 
MacKinnon notes that feminists have given a variety of answers to the 
question of what counts as a woman. She identifies two extremes. At one 
extreme, there is feminism in which womanhood is “almost purely biological, in 
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which women are defined by female biology” (54). At the other, there is 
feminism that sees the category as “almost purely social, in which women are 
defined by their social treatment” (1989, 54). MacKinnon does not explicitly say 
where she stands on or outside this continuum, but we can draw some 
inferences about her view. 
The first thing to note is that any feminist account must reject the 
association between women and inferiority, if it is to count as feminist at all. So 
any feminist account of womanness based on biology derives its feminism, on 
MacKinnon’s analysis, from one of two places. Female biology might be seen as 
the source or cause of women’s subordination. Alternatively, female biology 
might be seen as the terrain or subject-matter of contestation. MacKinnon 
certainly rejects the first option and seems to endorse the second. 
MacKinnon rejects the idea that biology is “the source” of women’s 
subordination, an idea that she attributes to feminists such as Simone de 
Beauvoir and Susan Brownmiller (1989, 55). MacKinnon argues that de Beauvoir 
sees childbirth and motherhood as necessarily natural functions involving no 
project, failing to realise that motherhood has no “universal invariant 
significance” (1989, 58).  
Similarly, MacKinnon critiques Brownmiller’s claim that the difference 
between male and female genitals is what makes rape possible. This claim relies 
on seeing the penis as in some sense necessarily active with the vagina passive; 
coitus is thus an act of penetration that can be performed aggressively. 
MacKinnon notes that the mere fact of genital biology cannot do the work 
needed for Brownmiller’s account, since it would be equally biologically possible 
for women to “lurk in bushes and forcibly engulf men” (1989, 56). We might 
think that this image is somewhat over-optimistic about women’s ability forcibly 
to procure an erection or proceed with coitus regardless, but MacKinnon’s 
general point is correct: rape and sexual assault do not necessarily involve what 
Brownmiller calls the “locking together” of penis and vagina, even when men 
attack women, and so the fact that women do not sexually assault men with 
anything like the frequency or ferocity that men attack women cannot be 
explained by their lacking a phallus. The existence of penises does not explain 
rape and sexual assault, and sexual assault does not require a penis or even a 
phallic object.  
In the social context of women’s subordination, to be sexually attacked is 
to be attacked by or as if by a penis. The penis itself is not an aggressive organ. It 
becomes one only when accompanied with physical strength, brute force, 
intimidation, or humiliation. By any of these features could, in a different social 
context, accompany sexual assault by or as if by vagina. MacKinnon 
demonstrates this alternate social possibility with her use of the language of 
engulfment. It is society, not biology, that determines that we do not fear 
aggressive vaginal engulfment (or smothering, flattening, compressing, 
devouring, the tropes of the vagina dentata that have been used by women to 
8




assert power and discourage rape [Blackledge 2003, 190–194]). Rape is explained 
by doctrines of masculinity and male supremacy, not the existence of penises. 
These doctrines portray the penis as a powerful instrument of dominance but 
they do not make it so. To paraphrase Andrea Dworkin, have you ever wondered 
why women do not frequently rape men? It’s not because there’s a shortage of 
dildos.6 
Viewed in this way Brownmiller’s and de Beauvoir’s accounts of biology 
as the cause of subordination are question-begging. They assert that biology 
causes social subordination, but in fact biology subordinates only if it is socially 
interpreted as subordinating. As MacKinnon puts it, “Social and political 
inequality begins indifferent to sameness and difference. Differences are 
inequality’s post hoc excuse, its conclusory artefact, its outcome presented as its 
origin” (1989, 218). 
Brownmiller’s and de Beauvoir’s accounts may be question-begging, but 
what makes them feminist is their insistence on applying normative critique to 
biology and nature. Feminism along these lines encourages a sharp line between 
nature and nurture, biology and culture: nature may make something possible or 
even likely, but it does not make it right. Normative critique, judgement, is 
crucial here. Brownmiller wants to recognise and prosecute rape as an 
illegitimate attack; de Beauvoir wants to free women from the fetish of 
motherhood that stifles their active creativity.  
MacKinnon rejects these feminisms insofar as they are based on a 
normative critique of a biological reality perceived as autonomously, albeit not 
inevitably, producing subordination. These feminisms, which she identifies with 
liberalism, “construe evidence of women’s subordination as evidence of 
women’s difference, elevating the body of women’s oppression to the level of a 
universal, a category beyond history” (1989, 59). 
What we are left with is the idea that “women’s biology is part of the 
terrain on which a struggle for dominance is acted out” (1989, 54); or, as she 
puts it earlier in the book, “A theory is feminist to the extent it is persuaded that 
women have been unjustly unequal to men because of the social meaning of 
their bodies” (37). But this, of course, returns us to the question we started 
with—what is a woman? Which bodies, and which bodily features, have had the 
social meaning that counts as legitimating inferiority? Again we are returned to 
the biology/culture divide. MacKinnon highlights various answers within 
feminism without directly identifying which, if any, she endorses: 
                                                        
6 I am paraphrasing Dworkin’s speech to the Midwest Regional Conference of the 
National Organization for Changing Men: “I came here today because I don't 
believe that rape is inevitable or natural. If I did, I would have no reason to be here. 
If I did, my political practice would be different than it is. Have you ever wondered 
why we are not just in armed combat against you? It’s not because there’s a 
shortage of kitchen knives in this country” (Dworkin 1988, 169–170). 
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What, really, is a woman? Most feminists implicitly assume that biological 
femaleness is a sufficient index and bond because of what society makes 
of it: a woman is who lives in a female body. Others locate what women 
have in common within a shared reality of common treatment as a sex: a 
woman is who has been treated as one. A few define a woman as one 
who thinks of herself, or identifies, as one. Most consider women’s 
condition to be a descriptive fact of sex inequality: no woman escapes 
the meaning of being a woman within a social system that defines one 
according to gender, and most do. Women’s diversity is included in this 
definition, rather than undercutting it. Once sameness and difference are 
supplanted by a substantive analysis of position and interest, women 
become defined politically: since no woman is unaffected by whatever 
creates and destroys women as such, no woman is without stake in 
women’s situation. (1989, 38) 
 
MacKinnon seems to be rejecting the first three options, or at least 
highlighting their incompleteness,7 and endorsing the fourth. If that is right, then, 
for her, being a woman is not merely living in a female body, or merely being 
treated as a woman, or merely identifying as a woman. Instead—or perhaps 
additionally—MacKinnon seems to endorse the idea that “no woman escapes 
the meaning of being a woman within a social system that defines one according 
to gender.” Woman becomes a political category, and one with deep ontological 
significance: “no woman is unaffected by whatever creates and destroys women 
as such.”  
We can get a handle on this idea by considering the concept of 
(biological) essentialism. This idea has two main components. First, it invokes the 
idea that there is something about women’s biology that determines their social 
position. Second, it invokes the idea of commonalities between women: that 
women exist “as women,” in the sense of having some experiences that 
transcend other significant differences such as race and class. MacKinnon 
strongly defends the second idea, as discussed below. We have already seen that 
MacKinnon rejects the first idea, that biology determines women’s social 
position. This rejection continues in Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws:  
 
While treating women as if they are a biological group is not necessarily 
easy to avoid, to say that a biologically determinist theory of gender is 
not very feminist is not very controversial. Contemporary feminism 
begins by resisting biology as destiny. If women’s bodies determine 
women’s inferior social status, the possibilities for sex equality are pretty 
                                                        
7 For the argument that woman is a “cluster concept,” requiring resemblance 
rather than identity between its members, see Stoljar 1995. 
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limited. On this simplest level, one cannot be essentialist and feminist at 
the same time. (2005, 86) 
 
However, this first dimension of essentialism actually disguises two contrasting 
claims. While it is not true that biology actually explains or justifies women’s 
oppression, it is true that biology is often used socially to explain or justify the 
oppression of women. Consider the claim that “women are subordinated 
because women can get pregnant.” As a description of social reality, it is true. 
The fact or assumption that some women and not men can become pregnant 
does lead to their subordination in many ways: it contributes to them being paid 
less, promoted less, and hired less than men; it allows women to be controlled 
through restrictions on the availability of birth control and abortion; and it can 
be a contributory factor in women’s vulnerability to domestic violence. But this 
does not mean that the fact of pregnancy necessarily or essentially explains 
women’s subjection. A feminist society would not use women’s propensity to 
pregnancy in these ways. As a statement of essential reality, “women are 
subordinated because women can get pregnant” is false.  
Feminists and anti-feminists do not always expressly distinguish these 
meanings, which can lead to confusion. Feminism is in part the simultaneous 
realisation of and resistance to the fact that women’s bodies are used to subject 
them. We need to be careful to distinguish feminist identification of a social 
reality with an anti-feminist identification of an essential reality. MacKinnon 
herself makes this distinction clearly and emphatically, but it is often missed by 
critics of feminism in general and of her work in particular.  
For MacKinnon, it is the truth of the identification of social reality that 
explains the truth of the second aspect of essentialism: the idea of commonality 
between women. This idea of commonality between women can be understood 
in different ways. One answer to the question of what it is that women share “as 
women” is that they share some biological feature. On this account, women 
share the experience of having female bodies, and female bodies have a variety 
of uniquely female experiences such as menstruation, gestation, childbirth, and 
breastfeeding. Many feminists8 insist on the significance of these biological 
experiences both to individual women and to women as a group, and their work 
is vitally important.  
But though these experiences are shared by many women they are not 
shared by all women. Some do not conceive, gestate, birth or breastfeed a child, 
and some do not menstruate. The fact that some women, including those who 
have what is commonly called “female biology,”9 do not share some or any of 
                                                        
8 Young (2005) is a notable example. 
9 Many trans people and scholars reject references to “female biology,” since 
they argue that even sex categories are social and perhaps reject the very idea of 
a biological element to sex or gender. This is a live question within feminist and 
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these experiences means that it is problematic to speak of them as phenomena 
that unite all women. It does not mean that it is problematic to speak of them as 
phenomena that unite women. A significant part of the ordinary everyday life 
that feminist consciousness-raising uncovers as significant and as political 
concerns bodily experiences and the way they are socially treated—for example, 
the shame and secrecy associated with menstruation, together with the ways 
that it is used as a trope to undermine women as irrational or unreliable. The 
demonization of menstruation is an issue that affects all women by affecting 
their social and political status, regardless of whether they have ever 
menstruated or will do so in the future. 
When feminists including MacKinnon insist on the commonalities 
between women they predominantly mean that women share the experience of 
being socially constructed and situated as women. They share the fact that they 
are treated as inferior to men because they are women. This shared experience 
applies even if they are also treated as superior to some other women and men 
because of their position in another dimension of privilege such as race and 
class.  
Sally Haslanger’s work seems to question that conclusion. She gives the 
example of a black man who is treated as a legitimate target for systemic police 
violence because he is both “Black and male,” and argues that in cases like these 
“someone marked for subordination by reference to (assumed) male anatomy 
does not qualify as a woman, but also, in the particular context, is not socially 
positioned as a man” (2000, 41). Haslanger’s account suggests that people who 
would usually be referred to as men on the basis of their “assumed male 
anatomy” do not necessarily share the experience of being dominant. But, for 
Haslanger, that experience of being dominant (an experience which accompanies 
being socially identified as male and thus accorded male privilege) is necessary 
for someone to be a man. It follows for her that a person with “male anatomy” 
who is being subordinated is, at that moment at least, not a man—even if 
common usage and his own gender identity would label him as one. By 
implication, a person with “female anatomy” in a position of dominance or 
power is not a woman and does not share the experience of womanness with 
other women, even those with the same anatomy. 
The problem with this aspect of Haslanger’s analysis is that a black man’s 
subordination as compared to white men is compatible with his dominance as 
compared to black women. It is thus problematic to say that in this interaction 
the black man loses his manliness. The dominance of masculinity does not 
translate into absolute dominance; it intersects with other hierarchies. But in 
                                                        
trans theory: how does biology itself interact with gender experience and 
identity? I want to leave open the idea that, while sex categories are social, they 
are not only social. For an argument that sex categories have a biological basis at 
the group level, see Richardson (2013). 
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male supremacist society there is no situation in which a woman is socially 
positioned as superior to a man of her own race, class, and so on. Even a woman 
in a position of great power, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, is 
subjected to sexist commentary that serves to mark her as other from and 
inferior to men in equivalent positions, and in some respects to all men.10  
As MacKinnon writes in Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws:  
 
[Elizabeth Spelman writes about] “assumptions of feminism.” These 
assumptions include “that women can be talked about ‘as women,’ . . . 
are oppressed ‘as women,’ . . . that women’s situation can be contrasted 
to men’s” and so on. Professor Spelman is wrong to call these 
assumptions. They have been hard-won discoveries. Calling feminism 
“essentialist” in this sense thus misses the point. Analysing women “as 
women” says nothing about whether an analysis is essentialist. It all 
depends on how you analyse them “as women”: on whether what makes 
a woman be a woman, analytically, is deemed inherent in their bodies or 
is produced through their socially lived conditions. (2005, 86) 
 
So feminism asserts that there is a reality to how women are treated as women, 
and that this does lead to a commonality between women. Moreover, this 
shared experience and treatment is often related to assumptions about their 
biology, to their socially perceived femaleness, in the sense that women’s bodies 
are the terrain on which gender hierarchy is played out. But this is not to say that 
women’s bodies produce their social position. Society dictates that women are 
to be subjected, and it also dictates that much of this subjection will be played 
out on their bodies, and it also dictates that women’s bodies are to be 




                                                        
10 See Mary Dejevsky, “If even Merkel attracts ‘black widow spider’ sexism, what 
hope is there for the rest of us?” Independent, 25 September 2013, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/if-even-merkel-attracts-black-
widow-spider-sexism-what-hope-is-there-for-the-rest-of-us-8839577.html; 
Ngaire Donaghue, “Gender bias: why appearance focus fuels sexism in media,” 
Conversation, 13 April 2013, http://theconversation.com/gender-bias-why-
appearance-focus-fuels-sexism-in-media-13325; and Amelia Hill, “Sexist 
stereotypes dominate front pages of British newspapers, research finds,” 
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What does this analysis of gender and essentialism mean about what we 
ought to do? What are the political implications? In a recent interview published 
on the TransAdvocate website, MacKinnon reiterates her distaste for morality 
and also, in some circumstances, for judgment. For example, she repeats several 
times her support for trans people and states that there is no need to justify 
what she calls “individual people’s decisions about the social presentation of 
their bodies” (Williams 2015). At the same time, she does make normative, 
political criticisms, some implicit and some more forthright. For example, she 
states: 
 
There is no relation between the biology of sex and the meanings socially 
enforced on it, other than the very real consequences of the social 
system of sexual politics that does that forcing. This does, of course, raise 
the question: if it is all a social construction, why intervene in the biology 
of sex? That is a real political question. (Williams 2015) 
 
This statement implicitly questions sex-reassignment surgery and other forms of 
medical intervention such as hormone treatments. The interviewer does not pick 
up on this point, and so we do not have a close analysis of why this “real political 
question” has no implications for “individual people’s decisions about the social 
presentation of their bodies.” But the comment is not a one-off: MacKinnon also 
raises questions that do seem directly to affect individual choices, such as when 
she states “if [as I agree] ‘sex creates oppression,’ how does changing from one 
sex to another oppose that oppression? If ‘there is no sex,’ how do we describe 
the gain and stake in changing it?” (Williams 2015). 
The general political-philosophical issue is this: if biology is not the cause 
of oppression, what is its role, both actual and ideal? What significance should 
we attach to biology? How do changes in biology affect oppression? And what is 
the significance of shifting our definition of “woman”—and, for that matter, of 
“man”—so that it does, or does not, require certain biological features?  
Viewed in this context, indeed in any recognisably feminist context, 
“individual people’s decisions about the social presentation of their bodies” are 
necessarily political. After all, the personal is political. We cannot act without 
being at once the product and the producer of social meaning. Trans issues are 
paradigmatic examples of MacKinnon’s claim that “women’s biology is part of 
the terrain on which a struggle for dominance is acted out” (1989, 54). Who 
counts as a woman? Which privileges does a trans person acquire and which do 
they lose? Who gets to speak for women or as a woman? If biology does not 
determine one’s gender position, can men speak for women? If men can speak 
for women, can women speak for women? Can they speak at all?  
In the TransAdvocate interview, the main target of MacKinnon’s 
judgment is non-feminist women: 
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Having been surrounded by born women who do not identify as women 
particularly, and reject feminism as having nothing to do with them, it has 
been inspiring to encounter transwomen who do identify as women, 
actively oppose violence against women including prostitution (in which 
those who engage have little choice), and are strong feminists. “Woman” 
can be, in part, a political identification. To be a woman, one does have 
to live women’s status. Transwomen are living it and, in my experience, 
bring a valuable perspective on it as well. 
I have encountered transwomen with excellent, clear feminist 
politics. They are quite a contrast to the many privileged women I am 
often surrounded by who deny that sex discrimination exists or who 
assert that prostitution is a liberating choice for women. I’ve encountered 
transwomen who are prostituting who strongly oppose prostitution, who 
make clear that they would not be in prostitution if they could be paid to 
do anything else. And I’m supposed to conclude that the born women 
who support prostitution are my team? (Williams 2015) 
 
In these passages, MacKinnon praises feminists and judges non-feminists, with 
particular judgment implied for “born women” non-feminists, which is surprising. 
But what strikes me particularly is MacKinnon’s praise for people who “identify 
as women.”  
Elsewhere MacKinnon is scathing about the focus on identity, describing 
it as a “shift away from realities of power in the world” (2005, 90). Identity, she 
writes, “is not women’s problem. Reality is: a reality of group oppression that 
exists whether we identify with our group or not” (2005, 90). So why should it be 
praiseworthy to “identify as a woman,” or problematic not to?  
It would be implausible to interpret MacKinnon as suggesting that there 
is anything suspect about a woman not particularly identifying with femininity, 
since nonconformity to feminine practices such as passivity, beauty, and 
submissiveness has always been a central part of radical feminism. Alternatively, 
if the category “woman” is a social category, and if women are socially defined as 
the sex that is subordinated, then “identifying as a woman” seems to mean 
“identifying as a member of a subordinate group.” But feminists have pointed 
out that there are many sensible reasons not to “identify as women particularly,” 
if that means identifying with one’s position of subordination in a male 
supremacist world (Reilly-Cooper 2014). It is plausible in fact to think of feminism 
as the claim that one can identify as a woman in the sense of recognising the 
significance of one’s embodied experience and socialisation as female, while 
rejecting women’s subordinate position and thus refusing to identify as a woman 
in the sense of refusing to “live women’s status.” Feminists recognise that 
women are treated as subordinates and actively fight for the erasure of this 
subordination. If the end of male supremacy means the erasure of the social 
category of woman then it would seem right for feminists not to identify 
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particularly as women, socially; instead, a feminist would identify as a human 
first and foremost, and would identify as a woman only in the sense of 
recognising the social meaning of her body and socialisation, and feeling 
solidarity with others whose bodies and socialisation rendered them similarly 
liable to subordination. 
Alternatively, the sense of “identifying as a woman” that MacKinnon is 
praising might be synonymous with “identifying as a feminist.” But that 
identification has no direct relationship to sex or gender. Feminists can be male 
or female, gay or straight, masculine or feminine, trans or not. It would be 
clearer then if MacKinnon were to say that some people are feminist and some 
are not, regardless of biology or social position, and that it is better to be a 
feminist. 
But the question then raised by MacKinnon becomes: who is on “my 
team”? Is it women, defined however they are defined by patriarchy, as a 
subordinated group, the target of eroticised domination? Or is it feminists, 
however constituted: those who criticise male supremacy, even if they benefit 
from it? The notion that all feminists are on the same team seems initially 
attractive, but it is troubling if the team “feminists” should somehow be pitted 
against those women who do not identify as women, or do not identify as 
feminists, if those are different categories. This image of teams means that 
women who are complicit with patriarchy are ranked lower than those people 
who critique it, even if those people are men who also benefit from patriarchy 
and to whom patriarchy grants the right to act as critic. Yet feminist analysis of 
male supremacy of the sort we find in Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 
provides us with ample resources to understand the complicity of the oppressed. 
And the image of opposing teams is also vulnerable to MacKinnon’s own critique 
of the way that liberal feminism focuses on the individual woman and her actions 
rather than on women as a unified group or class. 
One answer to this problem is consciousness-raising as a collective 
practice, as something that women do together. MacKinnon writes:  
 
If every woman’s views are true, regardless of content, how is feminism 
to criticize the content and process of women’s determination, much less 
change it? Regardless of the weight or place accorded daily life or 
women’s insight, feminist theory probes hidden meanings in ordinariness 
and proceeds as if the truth of women’s condition is accessible to 
women’s collective inquiry. The pursuit of the truth of women’s reality is 
the process of consciousness; the life situation of consciousness, its 
determination articulated in the minutiae of everyday existence, is what 
feminist consciousness seeks to be conscious of. (1989, 39) 
 
It is thus the collective consciousness-raising of feminism that enables us to 
question any individual woman’s perspective: together, we can uncover and seek 
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to change the various ways in which we are determined. But, of course, even 
consciousness-raising need not produce consensus, and so we are still faced with 
the issue of how to deal, methodologically speaking, with the persistence of 
disagreements between women. We are also still faced with the problem of how 
to answer the prior question of who qualifies as a woman: whose consciousness 
counts? 
Consciousness-raising’s focus on the everyday, on ordinariness, shows us 
that feminists should be interested in someone’s presentation of their own body. 
Bodily presentation is part of the ordinariness of daily life, part of how one fits in 
with or resists gender norms, how one fits in with or resists structures more 
generally. Recall MacKinnon’s statement in Toward a Feminist Theory of the 
State that “a theory is feminist to the extent it is persuaded that women have 
been unjustly unequal to men because of the social meaning of their bodies” 
(1989, 37). This seems to make the social meaning of bodies a fundamental 
feminist question, and a person’s use of their own body, and claims about its 
proper social place, a fundamental feminist or anti-feminist act. 
Of course, one reason to refuse judgment of other people’s use of their 
own bodies is that women, feminist or not, know all too well what it is to be 
subject to such judgment; and feminists recognise such judgment as a 
subordinating political act. What we wear is political, how we present ourselves 
as feminine or masculine is political, and the act of endorsing or critiquing 
clothes or presentation is political.  
For example, wearing revealing clothes or high heels is to position oneself 
in a certain aspect of femininity. It is to say that one belongs there whether by 
choice or by necessity. Various responses to such dress are possible: one 
response from within male supremacy is to say that a person wearing such 
clothes deserves sexual assault, which is to affirm the male supremacist doctrine 
that to be feminine (or even just female) is to be worthy of such assault.  
Wearing such clothes—wearing any clothes11—thus becomes a political 
action, because it is to situate oneself in the category of feminine, a category 
which is taken by many to indicate worthiness for assault. But the possible 
motivations and meanings for this action are multiple, and there is no stable 
correlation between motivation (which depends on the agent) and meaning 
(which does not). Consider some examples of possible motivations. Wearing 
feminine clothing might be a necessary or normal route to access certain sorts of 
resources, such as sex or money or power, experienced by the wearer as a 
necessary evil or just the simple cost of life. It might be a preference, perceived 
as freely chosen yet socially constructed as all choices are, and this preference 
might present itself as urgent, profound, and essential to oneself, or as frivolous, 
                                                        
11 Wearing any clothes is a political action because it is to situate oneself, or 
attempt to situate oneself, inside or outside any number of socially defined and 
politically significant groups: gender, race, class, religion, culture, age, and so on. 
17
Chambers: Judging Women
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2017
  
pleasurable, and peripheral. It might be a conscious act of rebellion against 
constraining gender norms, such as in the drag performance or the feminist 
SlutWalk. Or it might be a wholehearted endorsement of those very same norms. 
How one presents oneself is inexorably political, in that it cannot make sense 
outside of a particular context of power.  
Moreover, how others respond to those presentations will depend on 
both their views about, and their position within, that context of power. Wearing 
feminine clothing might bring success or failure, acceptance or rejection, 
advantage or attack. When feminine clothes are worn by people whom 
observers assume to be women the result is simultaneously beneficial and 
harmful: women benefit from the approval they receive by conforming to norms 
of femininity at the same time as they are harmed for indicating their 
membership of the subordinate sex. This simultaneous benefit and harm can be 
seen in any number of examples: the businesswoman who must wear makeup 
and high heels to be accepted professionally, but who is then marked out as less 
serious than a man, less suitable for hiring or promotion, and less deserving of 
her salary; the young woman who must wear revealing clothing on a night out so 
as to be considered attractive by her peers and by potential male partners, but 
whose clothes simultaneously render her physically and symbolically vulnerable 
to rape; the woman who gains authenticity, comfort, and integrity from rejecting 
certain feminine beauty ideas, but whose grey hair and natural features earn her 
derision or disregard. 
The body and its presentation are thus deeply politically significant. But 
we can recognise this and still be wary of judging individuals. Women are 
damned if they do and damned if they don’t, so maybe we should stop damning! 
An example of this compassionate approach can be found in Andrea 
Dworkin’s Woman Hating. Dworkin urges us to “refuse to submit to all forms of 
behaviour and relationship which reinforce male-female polarity, which nourish 
basic patterns of male dominance and female submission” (1974, 192–193). She 
advocates the wholesale rejection of feminine beauty practices: “The body must 
be freed, liberated, quite literally: from paint and girdles and all varieties of crap. 
Women must stop mutilating their bodies and start living in them” (1974, 116). 
She envisages a future in which “community built on androgynous identity will 
mean the end of transsexuality as we know it” (1974, 186–187). At the same 
time, while we are not in that future, Dworkin argues that a trans person is “in a 
state of primary emergency as a transsexual” (1974, 186–187). A world that 
violently enforces a gender binary is a world which is hostile to trans people 
(and, of course, to women). In response, Dworkin argues, “Every transsexual has 
the right to survival on his/her own terms. That means that every transsexual is 
entitled to a sex-change operation, and it should be provided by the community 
as one of its functions. This is an emergency measure for an emergency 
condition” (1974, 186).  
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Emergency measures for emergency conditions are understandable and 
may be the best we can do in any given situation. Dworkin herself was the victim 
of the most vicious personal attacks, many of which focused on her refusal to 
participate in various norms and rituals of feminine appearance. As necessary as 
emergency measures are, though, we must be wary that they do not prolong the 





There is an intersection between the questions “what is a woman?” and 
“may women judge?” Feminists and women are increasingly wary of asserting a 
judgment about who counts as a woman because “transphobia” has become a 
stick to beat women with, feminist women in particular. In 1997 (published in 
2005), MacKinnon spoke of the way that the charge of essentialism was being 
used against feminism. In 2017, everything she says in the following excerpts 
from that talk could be said of transphobia. Replace “essentialism” with 
“transphobia” in the following paragraphs and you get a pretty accurate picture 
of the current climate: 
 
The “essentialism” charge has become a sneer, a tool of woman-bashing, 
with consequences that far outrun its merits. The widespread acceptance 
of the claim seems due more to its choice of target than its accuracy in 
hitting it. Male power is ecstatic; its defenders love the accusation that 
feminism is “essentialist,” even though they don’t really know what it 
means. They do know that it has divided women, which sure takes a lot 
of heat off. (2005, 88) 
 
Fear of being labelled “essentialist” . . . has far-reaching consequences. 
Those within and outside the academy who know that male power in all 
its forms remains entrenched also know they face defamatory attacks 
and potential threats to their economic survival if they say so. As 
“essentialism” has become a brand, a stigma, a contagious disease that 
you have to avoid feminism to avoid catching, it has become one more 
way that the connections and coherence of the ways women are 
oppressed as members of the group “women” can be covered up. It is 
silencing when women cannot tell the truth of what they know and 
survive. (2005, 89) 
 
The charge of transphobia is so damaging to feminism because it can be 
used to conflate the legitimate demand for acceptance, consideration, and 
support of trans people with the illegitimate demands for uncritical acceptance 
of very specific ways of thinking and speaking. Feminists who question some 
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forms of trans theory and practice, particularly those feminists who want to 
reserve some significance for “born women” and “female biology,” have been 
vilified and, sometimes, threatened with paradigmatic forms of male violence 
against women, namely rape and murder.12 Trans people, including trans 
women, are also subjected to violence, including sexual violence (Stotzer 2009). 
Violence against trans people is abhorrent. But feminist analysis shows us that 
violence against trans people and violence against trans-critical feminists are 
versions of the same thing. They are Misogyny 101, proof that women may not 
judge, that women may not assert their opinions, that women’s bodies and 
women’s bodily appearance is a crucial site of their oppression, and that it 
doesn’t much matter what sort of a woman you are or seem to be when 




The title of this paper is “Judging Women,” a phrase that can be 
understood in three senses. First, when is it acceptable or necessary to make 
judgements about what women do? Second, when can women engage in the act 
of judging? Third, how are we to judge who counts as a woman? MacKinnon’s 
work offers profound, sustained, rich analysis of these questions, but does not 
fully resolve them. This is not to say that full resolution is possible or desirable. It 
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